Release of Director’s Cuts: Gettysburg and G&G Set

Just a note that we found the Limited Edition boxed set of 4 Blu-Ray Discs of Gettysburg and Gods & Generals at Walmart for $59.  The set includes two booklets, a commemorative coin, a map and of course, the two films.

Gettysburg Director’s Cut contains 17 minutes of film footage not seen in the theaters.  It also contains some commentary by the Director and three “Vintage Featurettes.”

Gods and Generals Director’s Cut contains a whopping additional hour of ‘Never-Before-Seen Footage,’ plus a new introduction by Ted Turner and Director Ron Maxwell, 3 more “Vintage Featurettes,” new commentary and music by Bob Dylan.

Warner Home Video, in honor of the sesquicentennial commemoration, has made a donation to the Living Legacy Tree Planting Program to honor those who died during the American Civil War.  The trees will be planted along the Journey Through Hallowed Ground route.

Enjoy!

Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, by Allen Guelzo — A review

Gettysburg College Professor Allen C. Guelzo has written a book about the Gettysburg Campaign called Gettysburg: The Last Invasion [Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2013.  ISBN 978-0307-59408-2], due for release on May 14^th, 2013.  Professor Guelzo, the Henry R. Luce Professor of the Civil War Era, and Director of Civil War Era studies at Gettysburg College, is a Lincoln Prize winner, lecturer and published author of books and articles about American History, many about Abraham Lincoln.  The Last Invasion is the natural result of where he teaches and is certainly exceptionally well researched and well written.

Make no mistake, this book is not for the beginner, nor even the casual student of the Civil War.  Professor Guelzo is an erudite communicator both with his lectures and the written word.  The Last Invasion fulfills the expectation that it will meet his reputation for high vocabulary, exhaustive research, logic and common sense, and at times an acerbic wit.  This is a very learned book written by a very learned historian.

Many readers will compare this with Edwin Coddington’s The Gettysburg Campaign, long considered the authority on the entire Gettysburg Campaign.  It is a natural comparison, yet those who eventually will have read both books will see an enormous difference.  Although both books cover the same ground, Professor Guelzo finds much more ground from which to reap a far richer and more detailed description and interpretation of the campaign and the battle.

The Last Invasion starts at the top and works down to the richly and sometimes amusingly couched quoted tidbits from the actual soldiers who fought here.  But with him, context is everything.  In his acknowledgements, he clears the field of those with an antiwar agenda, including many of his peers, saying, “This book will not offer much comfort to those persuasions if only because we cannot talk about the American nineteenth century without talking about the Civil War and we cannot talk about the Civil War without acknowledging, even grudgingly, that the Civil War era’s singular event was a war, and that all other issues hung ineluctably on the results achieved by large numbers of organized citizens attempting to kill one another.” [p. xvi]

Along with context, he makes ample use of comparison, for example, pointing to the similarities and differences between the American and European histories, fighting styles, advances in weaponry and the resulting reshaping of tactics.  Adding to the commentary on the political landscape of the time, he depicts American liberalism as the response to the nagging stain of slavery on the American experiment.  Even the British of the ante bellum era mocked the U.S. for its hypocrisy of espousing freedom and slavery in the same breath.  While explaining that the war was about emancipation and the Battle of Gettysburg was singularly lacking in connection to that effort [no Blacks fought here, but as many as 30,000 slaves were here with the Army of Northern Virginia, and even Lincoln, in his grand address in November, 1863 made no reference to slavery at all, only to the war], he logically explains the argument that the war was necessary to emancipate the slaves:  there could be no emancipation if the slaves were in a foreign country called the Confederate States of America, therefore, reunification was necessary to accomplish emancipation.  [p. xviii]

He writes about American liberalism as the outcome of the liberal democracy created by the collection of liberal activists we now reverently call ‘The Founders.’  [Indeed, never before in the nation’s history had the government been led by a liberal president [Lincoln], and a liberal Congress – headlined by the rabidly abolitionist ‘Radical Republicans,’ who were farther to the left than was Abraham Lincoln.  By the end of 1864 the Republican Salmon P. Chase was the Chief Justice of the United States.]

In the opening chapter, he sets forth a description of the American soldier.  “For most in the Union Army,” he writes, “the war was a campaign to save liberal democracy from a conspiracy to replant European-style aristocracy in America.” [p. 14]

Drilling down toward the Battle, he creates another contextual layer in the history of the war up to the start of the Gettysburg Campaign.  In succinct details he shows the strategic goals of the Confederates.  He paints a picture of Robert E. Lee as perhaps the only one of Jefferson Davis’ commanders who could dissuade him from a plan, such as the plan to transfer some of James Longstreet’s Corps west to the defense of Vicksburg, Mississippi.  Lee opposed that, and after a two day conference with Davis and CSA Secretary of War Seddon, Lee was finally unfettered enough to begin his campaign.  Thus he hoped to end the war by capturing Harrisburg, perhaps, but hopefully defeating the Army of the Potomac soundly enough to gain foreign recognition for the Confederacy, and to sway public opinion in the North to force Lincoln to accept a peace with an independent Confederacy.

Leading up to the campaign were the [mostly] foibles of the previous Union commanders, like George B. McClellan, who while being directly and indirectly disloyal and disobedient to Lincoln, was also attempting on his own to conduct peace negotiations with the Confederacy under the cover of prisoner exchange talks.  With a nod to Ambrose Burnside, saddled with some disloyal staff left over from McClellan, he spends a good deal of time discussing ‘Fighting’ Joe Hooker.

Avid students of the American Civil War and the Battle of Gettysburg will need to read this book to see if Professor Guelzo does indeed answer the questions about the Battle that he outlines in the acknowledgements:

• “Did J.E.B. Stuart lose the battle before it even started by galloping off on a senseless joyride with the Confederate Cavalry, and thus deprive the Confederates of intelligence- gathering capacity?
• “Did Richard Ewell lose the battle because he lacked the energy and the ruthlessness to press his successes on July 1^st to the point of driving the battered Union forces off Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill?
• “Did Dan Sickles force George Meade to stay and fight at Gettysburg on July 2^nd, as Sickles claimed after the war?
• “Was James Longstreet criminally negligent by insolently refusing to mount the Confederate attacks on July 2^nd and 3^rd with the appropriate spirit Lee demanded?”

“These are only the most prominent  of the Gettysburg controversies, and I put forward the answers I do with the resigned confidence that neither reason nor reasonableness is guaranteed certainty of success over self-interest and braggadocio.” [p. xv]

Thus Professor Guelzo reminds us that we are left, in most cases, to the reminiscences and official reports of those involved to provide the whole picture of events.  Those reports and reminiscences very often are full of verbiage that either covers over a bad performance, or falsely raises the importance of a performance, or sometimes both.

More than one historian has fallen prey to those practices as the lessons of the Lost Cause Mythology have shown us.

Not since Jeffry Wert’s Gettysburg: The Third Day has there been a book so full of rich detail about the Battle of Gettysburg.  Frankly I was moved to tears at the anguish displayed in the most complete recounting [by Sir Arthur Fremantle, a British Military Observer with the Army of Northern Virginia] I’ve ever seen, of Lee’s encounter, not just with George Pickett, but with many other officers and men returning in defeat from Pickett’s grand assault; and then with a swelling of pride when reading that General David Birney ordered the band from the 114th Pennsylvania Infantry [Collis' Zouaves] to the front of the line of battle on July 4th.  “They played the usual ‘national airs, finishing up with the ‘Star Spangled Banner’. At that moment the rebels sent a shell over our lines.’  It was the last shot of the Battle of Gettysburg.”[pp. 427 ff, p. 434]

I have thoroughly enjoyed this journey through time to garner new insights into the Battle of Gettysburg.  Professor Guelzo has a unique style of prose that takes some getting used to, yet after one catches the flow of it, the going is easy.  At that point one finds himself stopping to go back and see if he read that part correctly, and say, “Is that the way it actually happened?  Well, of course it did, it makes all the sense in the world!”  And each of the many, many times that happens in this book, the reader is thus enriched.  It is a sensible book, and an honest look at mid-nineteenth century American politics, mores, society, government and of course, most of all, war.

I heartily, ineluctably, endorse Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, as a must-have in any serious Civil War library.  And kudos to Professor Guelzo for a job exceedingly well done.  There has long been a need to have a single volume, concise, yet insightful telling of the Gettysburg Campaign and Battle, and the Professor’s book is that and more.

I would like to thank the Alfred A. Knopf Company for sending a review copy of the book and inviting this review.  It was very kind of them.  It has been a pleasure and an honor.

For those who are close by, or who know someone close by, Professor Guelzo will be signing copies of his book at the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitor’s Center on Tuesday, May 14^th, 2013 between the hours of noon and 3 PM.

W. G. Davis

For Three Days at Gettysburg Blog

Why Lee Stayed to Fight

[Earlier we explored Lee’s order to Heth: Do not bring on a general engagement.]  We asked why  Lee stayed to fight after the first day.  Here is what we think is the reason Lee stayed after the fighting ended the first day.]

We think Lee was hedging his bet when he ordered Heth not to bring on a general engagement.

First, he learned from Longstreet’s spy, Harrison, that Meade was the new commander of the Army of the Potomac and that the AoP was on the way north late in the evening on June 28th.  He began issuing orders to concentrate on Chambersburg immediately.  As a result, Johnson’s Division of Ewell’s Corps was sent from Carlisle toward Chambersburg.  After Johnson started on the 29th, and at a point that Ewell judged too late to turn Johnson, Ewell received a second order from Lee ordering the Second Corps [Ewell] to concentrate on Heidlersburg, keeping the Second Corps east of South Mountain.  It also kept Ewell’s two divisions poised to move to Gettysburg, or a few miles farther to Cashtown.

 And there, perhaps is the key to Lee’s thinking.

We believe Lee was unsure of what Union forces were at Gettysburg, and if indeed the Army of the Potomac beat him to that town, then he would not have the choice of the ground on which he was to fight.  Therefore, Lee would not be able to fight a defensive engagement, but rather be forced to make an offensive assault, and with Meade getting there first, the assault would likely be made against fortified positions.

 Hence, his orders included Cashtown as a point of concentration.

 But why Cashtown?

 The Chambersburg Pike was good road, all the way to Chambersburg.  The ground along that route offered numerous opportunities to slow or stop a pursuing force.  With Hill already there, and Longstreet on the way, there was power coming down that road off South Mountain toward Gettysburg.  If Heth did get ensnared in a fight at Gettysburg, Lee had Ewell north of town, with good roads heading into Gettysburg, and Hill followed by Longstreet heading east on Chambersburg Pike.  And that is what happened.

 On the other hand, if Heth did not get into a fight at Gettysburg, Lee was free to withdraw up the mountain and pick a spot to dig in and invite Meade to come at him.  Or, he could have simply crossed back into the Cumberland Valley and headed back to Virginia.  But we are betting Lee would have dug in on the east slope of South Mountain and waited for Meade to attack.  He knew Meade would be forced to attack…by his own generals, by the Northern newspaper editors, and by Lincoln.

 He would have been wise to send a Brigade or two of Infantry, and a Brigade of Cavalry [Jenkins, Imboden?] south in the Cumberland Valley and then east up the mountain to cover each of the passes over the mountain west of Fairfield.  Obviously, none of this includes Stuart and his Cavalry force because Lee had little idea where he was or whether he was under attack or not [indeed, he was under attack, at Hanover on June 30, at Hunterstown on July 2, both by newly minted Brigadier General George A. Custer’s Michigan Brigade, and others].  Certainly Lee did know that the Union Army had taken position between himself and Stuart.

Could it be that Lee decided to stay and fight at Gettysburg beyond the first day because of Stuart?  He could not afford to lose Stuart’s Cavalry, and leaving him isolated on the other side of the Army of the Potomac put Stuart into a position where he had no escape, so Lee had to stay nearby and essentially shorten the distance Stuart had to travel to get back with Lee’s army, and pray that Stuart could do it.  And by placing himself at Gettysburg with the Army of the Potomac to the Southeast of town, and with the Army of the Potomac south of him, Lee effectively opened the path for Stuart and his troopers to rejoin the Army of Northern Virginia.

What do you think?

The Battle for Little Round Top – Part 2

[NB: Images are clickable and can be enlarged]

As most of the history books have it, Colonel William Oates, Commander of the 15th Alabama Infantry Regiment, was in the center of Law’s Brigade at the southern end of Warfield Ridge as they awaited the order of their Division commander, General John Bell Hood, to advance in a generally northeasterly direction toward Little Round Top.  On the march to Gettysburg since 2 AM, and immediately caught up in Longstreet’s March and Counter March west of town on the afternoon of July 2nd, Oates realized his men were out of water.  He sent a group of soldiers to collect all the canteens in the regiment and sent them off to fill those canteens.  Those men were never reunited with the regiment.  When Oates then turned back to the front, he saw that the Brigade had stepped off without him.  Hurrying and sliding to the right, since his spot in line was being closed from the right, Oates quick-stepped his men and quickly had them guiding along Plum Run [on their right], and being pushed up the western flank of Big Round Top by the regiment on his left, the 47th Alabama.  Stopping briefly on the way to the summit of Big Round Top [BRT], Colonel Sheffield’s messenger rode up to Oates on horseback and instructed Oates to keep moving.

[Note: General Hood went down with a serious wound to his arm shortly after the Division stepped off, so Brigadier General Evander K. Law, commander of the Alabama Brigade, stepped up to command the Division, and Col. Sheffield of the 48th Alabama stepped up to command the Brigade.]

Oates then moved his men in a line of battle, upward in the face of what seemed like a regiment or a brigade of infantry they could barely see in the rough, tree and boulder filled terrain.   [In actuality it was a company of Sharpshooters, using breech-loaded Sharp's rifles, enabling them to put out an increased rate of fire.  That fooled several Confederate commanders at Gettysburg into misjudging the size of the units in front of them.]  Eventually, the infantry disappeared, and Oates and his regiment went over the crest of  BRT, and down into fame and glory in their encounter with the 20th Maine.

But something has always been awry with that account.  Directionally, it does not make sense.  The angle of ascent, from somewhere near the Slyder Farm, would put them on a west to east track, and his regiment would come out of the trees on the east slope of BRT just about at the Plank Farm.  That would put him almost directly across Taneytown Road from the Union Artillery Reserve Park, and would completely miss the 20th Maine and the Sharpshooters that joined Company B east of Chamberlain’s position on LRT.

Even had Oates turned north at the summit, he would not have lined up with Chamberlain, but would have arrived on Chamberlain’s left flank, which was the left flank of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg.  In that situation, Oates would have been in perfect position to roll up Chamberlain from his left flank.

Here is an image of those two scenarios:

Either one of these scenarios would have been serendipitously positive for the Army of Northern Virginia.  Wreak havoc on the Artillery Reserves, or, roll up the left flank of the Army of the Potomac.

Here is scenario one, moving easterly over the peak of BRT, and assaulting the Army of the Potomac’s Artillery Reserves:

Here is scenario two, turning northerly from the peak of BRT and attacking the left flank of the 20th Maine.

But we know that neither of these scenarios happened.  We are left, then, with the glaring fact that Oates and his Alabama Regiment, which was crowded constantly on his left by the 47th Alabama, never went up over the crest of BRT.

Then where did he go, what was his path?  Let’s ask Oates [from his after action report]:

“My regiment occupied the center of the brigade when the line of battle was formed.  During the advance, the two regiments on my right were moved by the left flank across my rear, which threw me on the extreme right of the whole line.  I encountered the enemy’s sharpshooters posted behind a stone fence, and sustained some loss thereby.  It was here that Lieut.  Col. Isaac B. Feagin, a most excellent and gallant officer, received a severe wound in the right knee, which caused him to lose his leg.  Privates [A.] Kennedy, of Company B, and [William] Trimner, of Company G, were killed at this point, and Private [G. E.] Spencer, Company D, severely wounded.”

Alright, he advanced on the right of the Brigade, which puts his right on, and eventually pushed across the lower reaches of Plum Run, which marks the base of the west slope of BRT.  And he is already angling to the right a bit, being pushed that way also by the 47th Alabama.

Stone Wall?  What stone wall?  The only stone walls in that area are across Plum Run, and part way up the slope of BRT.  [If you drive up South Confederate Avenue today after crossing Plum Run, part way up BRT you will see a field on the left.  In that field is the First Vermont Cavalry Monument, one of the units that participated in Farnsworth's [fatal] Charge the next day.  When you are there next, explore this field.  It is surrounded on three sides by stone walls [fences].  They bound [generally] the south, west and north sides of the field.

Here is a Google Earth image showing the route of attack made by the 15th Alabama.

Note how the path shifts downward, or to the right on the line of march.  Some of this is because of the disorganized line described above, but most of it is from pressure on Hood’s Division by the brigades of McLaw’s Division, which were to start on an angle similar to the way Hood lined up, but because of the presence of Graham’s Brigade of the Third Corps, Army of the Potomac in the Peach Orchard, McLaws Division was forced to proceed straight across the Emmitsburg Road, thereby forcing Hood to swerve to the right.

Also note the tip of the third arrow [from the left] is resting on the field up on BRT.  Here is an image of that field on the path from South Confederate Avenue:

The monument is the First Vermont Cavalry Regimental Monument.  Behind it you can just make out the stone fence that borders the south edge of the field.  The field is approximately just shy of 2 acres in size.  It was on this side of the stone fence that Union Sharpshooters delayed Oates progress up BRT.  Once they fell back, Oates men came over the fence and took a break.

Oates continues:

“After crossing the fence, I received an order from Brigadier-General Law to left-wheel my regiment and move in the direction of the heights upon my left, which order I failed to obey, for the reason that when I received it I was rapidly advancing up the mountain, and in my front I discovered a heavy force of the enemy.  Besides this, there was great difficulty in accomplishing the maneuver at that moment, as the regiment on my left (Forty-seventh Alabama) was crowding me on the left, and running into my regiment, which had already created considerable confusion.  In the event that I had obeyed the order, I should have come in contact with the regiment on my left, and also have-exposed my right flank to an enfilading fire from the enemy.  I therefore continued to press forward, my right passing over the top of the mountain, on the right of the line.”

At this point, Oates is aligned pretty much with South Confederate Avenue as it crests a rise [where the current parking area is located for the trail to the peak of BRT].  The “top of the mountain” Oates refers to is the crest of the spur over which South Confederate Avenue goes.  In all likelihood, Oates would not have been able to see the actual top of BRT on his right, due to the thickness of the woods.  In fact, the right of Oates regiment would likely have guided on the logging trail that became the modern road.

After a short hike through the trees, Oates men would have emerged from the woods at about this vantage point:

That is Warren Avenue in the front, and Sykes Avenue heading up to the crest of LRT.  To the right of Sykes Avenue is the pair of low stone walls marking where the 20th Maine was arrayed.  Oates continues:

“On reaching the foot of the mountain below, I found the enemy in heavy force, posted in rear of large rocks upon a slight elevation beyond a depression of some 300 yards in width between the base of the mountain and the open plain beyond.  I engaged them, my right meeting the left of their line exactly.  Here I lost several gallant officers and men.”

The angle of this photo is the only angle that would meet the condition noted above.  “I engaged them, my right meeting the left of their line exactly.”

No other avenue of approach puts Oates on this line of attack.  No other avenue of approach allows Oates men to line up flank for flank.

Oates continues:

“After firing two or three rounds, I discovered that the enemy were giving way in my front.  I ordered a charge, and the enemy in my front fled, but that portion of his line confronting the two companies on my left held their ground, and continued a most galling fire upon my left.”

Actually, Chamberlain is starting to refuse his line.  Here is what he has to say:

“The artillery fire on our position had meanwhile been constant and heavy, but my formation was scarcely complete when the artillery was replaced by a vigorous infantry assault upon the center of our brigade to my right, but it very soon involved the right of my regiment and gradually extended along my entire front.  The action was quite sharp and at close quarters.

“In the midst of this, an officer from my center informed me that some important movement of the enemy was going on in his front, beyond that of the line with which we were engaged.  Mounting a large rock, I was able to see a considerable body of the enemy moving by the flank in rear of their line engaged, and passing from the direction of the foot of Great Round Top through the valley toward the front of my left.  The close engagement not allowing any change of front, I immediately stretched my regiment to the left, by taking intervals by the left flank, and at the same time “refusing” my left wing, so that it was nearly at right angles with my right, thus occupying about twice the extent of our ordinary front, some of the companies being brought into single rank when the nature of the ground gave sufficient strength or shelter.  My officers and men understood wishes so well that this movement was executed under fire, the right wing keeping up fire, without giving the enemy any occasion to seize or even to suspect their advantage.  But we were not a moment too soon; the enemy’s flanking column having gained their desired direction, burst upon my left, where they evidently had expected an unguarded flank, with great demonstration.”

So, now we know that Law’s Brigade engages Vincent’s Brigade  first with the 83rd Pennsylvania and the 44th New York [stacked in the center], then the 16th Michigan [on the right], then the 20th Maine [on the left].  And in the second paragraph, Col. Chamberlain explains when and why he began to stretch and refuse his line.

One last quote from Oates:

“Just at this moment, I discovered the regiment on my left (Forty-seventh Alabama) retiring.  I halted my regiment as its left reached a very large rock, and ordered a left-wheel of the regiment, which was executed in good order under fire, thus taking advantage of a ledge of rocks running off in a line perpendicular to the one I had just abandoned, and affording very good protection to my men.  This position enabled me to keep up a constant flank and cross fire upon the enemy, which in less than five minutes caused him to change front.”

There are two very important elements here.  First, he reports the Confederate regiment on his immediate left, the 47th Alabama, which was totally engaged with the 83rd Pennsylvania, was withdrawing.  Why is Oates still fighting and the 47th withdrawing?  Remember that defense in depth?  The 44th NY is right behind and above the 83rd Pennsylvania, so the 47th Alabama is taking fire from not one, but two stacked regiments in their front.  Also, at this point, Oates has shifted to the right in his flanking movement and he confirms Chamberlain refusing his line.

Oates goes on to report then that the enemy had flanked him on his right, which could only be Company B of the 20th Maine, which Chamberlain had posted five hundred yards east on what is now Wright Avenue, and behind a stone wall, where they were joined by that pesky bunch of Sharpshooters that had earlier caused so much trouble to Oates advance up BRT.

Next up, part 3, and the fight on the plateau between the 16th Michigan and 44th NY, vs. the 4th and 5th Texas regiments, and how Texas almost took Little Round Top.

Remember, please, your comments are welcome.  Click on the “leave a comment” link at the bottom of every post.

The Battle for Little Round Top – Part 1

[NB: Images are clickable and can be enlarged]

After intercepting the messenger from General Warren asking for a brigade to defend Little Round Top, Colonel Strong Vincent took it on his own hook to order his brigade [Third Brigade, 1st Division [Barnes], Fifth Corps [Sykes]] to the crest of Little Round Top.  Riding from just west of Plum Run on Wheatfield Road, Vincent, a Harvard educated lawyer from Erie Pennsylvania, and former commander of the 83rd Pennsylvania, rode to the top, met briefly with General Warren, and rode to the south side of Little Round Top to survey the ground.

In the approximate 10 minute span until his troops began to arrive, Vincent developed a plan of defense for the assault Warren had pointed to earlier, and that he could hear coming right at him.  And here is where the story gets interesting.

The history books show little detail about the Vincent Defense.  [All we have ever seen show the 20th Maine on the left facing due south, with the rest of the brigade forming a line of defense to the right: 83rd PA, 44th NY, and on the west side, on a plateau, the 16th Michigan.  To be sure, traditionally, the histories have this brigade in a line of defense along the military crest of the south and west faces of Little Round Top.  [The Military Crest is a location below the summit or top crest of an elevation which, when manned, will not expose the troops positioned there to observation from below silhouetted against the sky.]

In the image below, you can see the position of the 20th Maine on what we now call Vincent’s Spur, an elevation jutting from the eastern crest of Little Round Top [LRT] southeastward toward the small saddle that separates LRT from Big Round Top.  The regiment’s first positions are indicated by the stone walls erected lower than their final position on top of the Spur.

This image is taken from the west.  Visible in the center of the image at the top is the right flank marker of the 20th Maine after they refused their line into the tight “V” shape with its point to the right.  Initially, the regiment was posted only on this side of the spur, along the lower set of walls, in lines that sometimes overlapped.  And they were farther to the left [northerly] than this view shows.

Here is what Lt. Col. Chamberlain wrote in his after action report:

“In order to commence by making my right firm, I formed my regiment on the right into line, giving such direction to the line as should best secure the advantage of the rough, rocky, and stragglingly wooded ground.

“The line faced generally toward a more conspicuous eminence southwest of ours, which is known as Sugar Loaf, or Round Top.  Between this and my position intervened a smooth and thinly wooded hollow.  My line formed, I immediately detached Company B, Captain Morrill commanding, to extend from my left flank across this hollow as a line of skirmishers, with directions to act as occasion might dictate, to prevent a surprise on my exposed flank and rear.”

By “generally,” [our emphasis] Chamberlain meant toward the lower western slope of BRT.  He also describes the ground as rough and rocky, something which describes the west face of the spur much more closely than the top of the spur.

The next image is of the left of the 83rd Pennsylvania.  Note that the unit’s statue of Strong Vincent is closest to the left flank marker just to its right, and in front about 20 yards.  [Ignore the stone wall in the foreground, it was put there the next day by another unit.].  In fact, you cannot see the right flank marker in this image.  [Also note that the slope of the ground along Sykes Avenue, which crosses LRT south to north - after it crosses Warren Avenue, is built up to support the roadbed, but at the time of the battle was a natural slope down to the left flank marker of the 83rd PA].

This image is looking generally north from the north side of Warren Avenue.

Note, then, that the left flank marker of the 83rd PA, which would show the right of the line as viewed in this image, ends much farther downhill from either the main crest or the military crest of the south side of LRT.   Note also how Vincent’s spur beginning to diminish on the other side of Sykes Avenue as it heads up toward the east crest of LRT, and it was along there that the 20th Maine’s right was located, on an angle, but with an inviting gap between the right to the 20th ME and the left of the 83rd PA, which was forward of the Maine right.  Thus, the right of the 20th ME covered that gap, and the left of the 83rd PA.

That’s pretty advanced thinking, even for a Harvard educated lawyer.  But wait, there’s more.

In fact, the military crest directly behind the 83rd Pennsylvania is occupied by the 44th NY, which left no flank markers, but did leave a wall.  They were elevated behind the 83rd PA by about 15 yards up, and 30 yards distance on the ground.  And the right of the 44th NY connected with the left of the 16th Michigan on the plateau on the southwest corner of the Military crest of LRT.

The front of the 16th Michigan was essentially a cliff, and the 83rd Pennsylvania’s right was anchored to the base of that cliff.

So, in effect, we no longer have a line of defense, but rather a very sophisticated defense in depth, making maximum use of the terrain features to put concentrated fire on any assault by the enemy.

More than anything else, that effort on the part of Strong Vincent to defend the Union left at Gettysburg was what earned Vincent his posthumous promotion to Brigadier General.

Part 2 coming up: The fight for Vincent’s Spur.  Be ready for more new stuff!

Lee’s order to Heth: Do not bring on a general engagement.

In his orders to AP Hill and Harry Heth for Heth’s July 1 advance to Gettysburg with his full division, Heth was ordered to NOT bring on a general engagement.

Why would Lee do this?

He had 2 Divisions of Ewell’s Corps at Heidlersburg just a few miles north of Gettysburg. Much of AP Hill’s Corps was behind Heth on the Chambersburg Pike stretching back up South Mountain toward that town.  And Longstreet’s Corps was right behind Hill.

Coddington [page 190-191] says, referring to the message for Ewell’s Corps to concentrate on Heidlersburg:

“Although Lee’s second message to Ewell arrived too late to change Johnson’s route, it came in time to divert Rodes to Heidlersburg.  He started out on the morning of the 30th and had a “very fatiguing march through rain and mud,” twenty two miles by way of Petersburg [York Springs].  Meanwhile Early, who was still in York with his division of the Second Corps, received word of the change of plans late on June 29.  Captain Elliott Johnston of Ewell’s Staff brought him what was obviously a copy of Lee’s first note and verbal instructions to rejoin the rest of the corps on the “western side of the South Mountain,” instead of near Carlisle as had been previously instructed to do.  The next morning Early started his command on the Weigelstown and East Berlin Road leading to Heidlersburg.  He expected to go to Arendtsville and thence either to Shippensburg or to Greenwood `as circumstances might require.’  On the march he received another dispatch from Ewell and as directed, encamped his men three miles east of Heidlersburg on the road to East Berlin. Then he himself rode to Heidlersburg to confer with Ewell, who had accompanied Rodes’s division down from Carlisle. It was there that Early learned of Lee’s second message to Ewell ordering his division to a rendezvous with Rodes at Heidlersburg.

“This message had an important result which Lee perhaps anticipated but did not mention.  With the Second Corps, or a major portion of it, at Heidlersburg the Confederates would be able to approach Gettysburg from two directions should an engagement occur in that area…

“Ewell’s response to Lee’s directives was prompt and efficient.  In one day he brought together two of his divisions, which were miles apart, without a hitch…

“While at Heidlersburg on June 30 Ewell heard from A.P. Hill that the Third Corps was at Cashtown, and he decided to move toward it.  The next morning, not aware of any emergency, he got both divisions off to a reasonably early start, on two different routes so as to avoid overcrowding the roads.  Rodes went almost directly west by way of Middletown [Biglerville], and Early, since he was three miles east of Heidlersburg, was ordered to go south to Hunterstown on a road parallel to the Harrisburg Pike and then turn west toward Mummasburg and Cashtown.  By going to Hunterstown, which was a little more than half the distance from Heidlersburg to Gettysburg, Early could come within four miles of Gettysburg before turning west for Cashtown.  Should `circumstances dictate’ he could proceed to Gettysburg without a hitch.”

Coddington, Edwin B., The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command, Touchstone Press, New York, 1997. ISBN 0-684-84569-5

 So, with Ewell [minus Johnson's Division] at Heidlersburg and moving south toward Gettysburg and Cashtown, and Hill at Cashtown, why would Lee fear Heth getting involved heavily at Gettysburg?

 It could not have been because he wanted more than one division to start things, since there were four other divisions close at hand, two of which were actually moving toward Gettysburg.

 I have an idea about this, but I would love to see what others have to say first…

New Civil War Discussion Group

If you like to talk about the Civil War, or to learn about it, share ideas, and such, then a new online discussion group that should interest you is starting up.  Called “Contested Ground: Civil War History”, the group aims for good, scholarly discussion of the events leading up to, occurring during, and stemming from the American Civil War.

Now, as will all new groups, growth is slow at the start, so if you decide to check it out and like what you see, and join, hang in there.  It takes time to build membership and a message and file base.

This is NOT a Rebs vs. Yanks discussion group, but a group that aims for knowledge sharing among those who are students [and teachers] of the Civil War.

Feel free to join up and chime in.  It is free and hopefully fun and fascinating!

Click here:   Contested Ground: Civil War History

It will be well worth the joining!